The Effects of Decentralization on Forests and Forest Industries in Berau District, East Kalimantan Krystof Obidzinski and Christopher Barr Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)

Overview of Indonesia's Decentralisation Process
Since late 1998, Indonesia has undergone a process of rapid and far-reaching decentralisation. With this process, considerable degrees of administrative and regulatory authority have been transferred from the national government in Jakarta to the country's provincial and district governments. This transfer of authority has occurred across broad segments of the nation's economy and has sharply redefined the roles and responsibilities of government agencies at each level of the nation's administrative structure. With the locus of decision making shifting decisively away from the national government, Indonesia's ongoing decentralisation process marks a dramatic break from the highly centralized system of governance that characterized Suharto's New Order regime during the period 1966-1998.
To a significant extent, the process of decentralisation now occurring in Indonesia has been driven by the demands of provincial and district governments whose jurisdictions are rich in timber, petroleum, and other natural resources. Officials from resource-rich regions have long complained that the vast majority of the benefits from these assets have flowed away from their regions to the national government and to private sector companies closely associated with decision makers in Jakarta. While the New Order government kept a tight lid on calls for greater regional autonomy and regional control over natural resource revenues, the post-Suharto government has not been able to ignore these demands. On the contrary, since 1998 the country's senior leadership has recognized that its ability to maintain Indonesia's integrity as a nation may ultimately depend on its capacity to strike a more equitable balance of power between the national government, on the one hand, and the provincial and district governments, on the other.
Over the last three years, the national government has issued several important pieces of legislation aimed at transferring authority to the provincial and district governments, and at allowing resource-rich regions to retain a larger share of the fiscal revenues generated within their jurisdictions. The most significant of these have been Law 22 on Regional Governance and Law 25 on Fiscal Balancing, both of which were issued in May 1999. Together, these laws provide the legal basis for regional autonomy, laying out a broad framework for the decentralisation of administrative and regulatory authority primarily to the district level. These laws have been supported by a variety of implementing regulations and sector-specific decentralisation laws, including Law 41/1999, a revised version of Indonesia's Basic Forestry Law, which outlines the division of administrative authority in the forestry sector under regional autonomy.
In many parts of Indonesia, provincial and district officials acting in the spirit of regional autonomy have instituted reforms that extend well beyond the authority granted to them under the national government's decentralisation laws and regulations. Indeed, the formal decentralisation process has been driven, to a significant degree, not by policy decisions made at the national level but, rather, by decisions made by provincial and district level actors. This process has often been ad hoc in nature, with national policymakers frequently finding themselves in the position of having to react to fast moving changes that have occurred in the provinces and districts. Far from being a well-planned and carefully managed exercise in bureaucratic reorganization, the implementation of regional autonomy in Indonesia has been characterized by intense struggles among the different levels of government, each of which represents a competing set of political and economic interests. In this way, regional autonomy has stretched well beyond the formal decentralisation of administrative and regulatory authority; in practice, it also involves a significant, if largely informal and unplanned, devolution of power from the national government to its provincial and district-level counterparts.
The formal and informal processes of decentralisation have been accompanied by a wide-ranging set of governance and economic reforms, collectively known as reformasi, that are associated with Indonesia's transition away from Suharto's New Order regime. Broadly defined, reformasi refers to the transformation and dismantling of the policies, practices, and institutional structures through which the New Order leadership and a handful of well-connected conglomerates controlled the political and economic life of the country prior to Suharto's resignation in May 1998. While significant elements of the reformasi agenda coincide with the changes occurring under regional autonomy, these reform processes are also quite distinct. Whereas reformasi refers to a shift away from the constellation of interests and power structures that have supported a particular regime, decentralisation and regional autonomy refer to the transfer of authority from the national government to Indonesia's provincial and district governments.
Decentralisation of Forest Administration
The formal and informal processes of decentralisation that are now occurring in Indonesia have far-reaching implications for forest management and for the livelihoods of communities living in and around forested areas. On the positive side, experience from other countries suggests that decentralised systems of forest management often lead to more sustainable and equitable use of these resources, as decision makers are physically located closer to where their policies will be implemented (Conyers 1981; Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema 1983) . This proximity often brings with it improved understanding of the specific biophysical, social, and institutional conditions influencing forest management at the field level; better capacity to monitor the activities of forest user groups; and greater access to local knowledge about the management and utilization of forest resources-which are sometimes highly specific to particular social groups and/ or ecosystems (Carney 1995) .
In addition, decentralised forest administration often allows for greater participation on the part of forest communities in policy decision-making processes, and more direct accountability of policymakers to peoples whose livelihoods depend on forests (Brandon and Wells 1992) . Decentralisation also frequently implies a more equitable distribution of benefits from forest resources, as local communities and governments in forested regions are able to secure a greater portion of revenues from the extraction of timber and other forest products (Ascher 1995 , Ostrom 1990 ).
In addition to providing opportunities for expanded equity and improved forest
The Effects of Decentralisation on Forests and Forest Industries in Berau District, East Kalimantan vi management, however, decentralisation also carries significant risks. In many countries, national governments have decentralised without first creating the necessary institutional capacity at the provincial or district levels to administer forests effectively (Rivera 1996) . Often, national governments assign tasks to provincial and district governments without giving them adequate resources for carrying out these tasks. Most provincial and district governments lack essential technical skills and must look to other entities for advice, training, and technical information. In cases where local elites have been strong and/or traditionally marginalized groups have been unable to organize themselves, decentralisation has often strengthened pre-existing power relations, rather than promoting democratic decision-making processes (Utting 1993) . Finally, even when elite groups do not dominate provincial and district governments, it is often the case that these governments have little interest in sustainable forest management.
Indonesia's Forestry Sector
The manner in which decentralisation affects forest management, community livelihoods and economic development is of particular significance in Indonesia due to the scale and importance of the country's forest resources. Indonesia has the world's third largest tract of tropical forests, surpassed in area only by those of Brazil and Congo. In 1997, the country's total forest cover was officially estimated to be 100 million ha (MOFEC, cited in World Bank 2001) . It has been conservatively estimated that at least 20 million people depend on Indonesia's forests for the bulk of their livelihoods (Sunderlin et al. 2000) . Over the last three decades, the national government has allocated over 60 million ha of forest to commercial logging companies, and Indonesia's forestry sector industries have long ranked second only to petroleum in terms of their contribution to GNP (Barr 2001) . The forestry sector currently generates approximately US$7 billion in annual revenues.
Well before the country's ongoing decentralisation process began in late 1998, Indonesia's forestry sector had entered a period of crisis. From the mid-1980s onward, deforestation is estimated to have occurred at a pace of 1.6 million ha per year (Toha 2000) . A major factor driving this high level of deforestation and associated forest degradation has been overcapacity in the nation's wood processing industries. Through the mid-1990s, Indonesia's sawnwood, plywood, and pulp industries are collectively estimated to have consumed 60-80 million m 3 of wood per year (Barr 2001 , Scotland et al. 1998 . Log consumption on this scale has stood well above the Indonesian government's own widelycited sustainable timber harvest threshold of 25 million m 3 per year. Moreover, with few effective regulatory structures in Indonesia's forestry sector, domestic demand for timber has resulted in large volumes of wood being harvested from illegal sources (ITFMP 1999) . At the same time, a decline in the nation's HPH timber concession system, coupled with rapid expansion in oil palm and other forms of agroindustrial plantations, has meant that a growing portion of the nation's wood supply has been obtained through clearing of natural forest rather than selective harvesting at multiple-rotation timber concessions (Barr 2001) .
Krystof Obidzinski and Christopher Barr vii
Scope and Methods of the Present Study
The present report examines the preliminary effects of decentralisation of forest administration in the Berau district of East Kalimantan Province. This report presents the findings from one of nine district level case studies carried out during 2000 and early 2001 by the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) in four provinces: Riau, East Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, and West Kalimantan. The findings presented in these studies reflect the conditions and processes that existed in the study districts during the initial phase of Indonesia's decentralisation process.
Each of the case studies used a rapid appraisal methodology for gathering data at the district and provincial levels. For each case study, preliminary visits were made to the district and provincial capitals to establish initial contacts and to identify key issues. Second visits for data gathering were then carried out for periods of 10-14 days in each district, with shorter amounts of time in the provincial capitals. The collection of primary data involved semi-structured interviews with key informants, including government officials, forest industry actors, members of communities living in and around forests, political party representatives, officers from the regional military command and police force, informal district leaders, representatives from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), university researchers, and individuals involved with donor agencies and development projects. Data collection also involved the review of primary and secondary documents, including district and provincial laws and regulations, government statistics, regional news media articles, industry publications, research studies, and reports prepared by NGOs and donor agencies.
Each of these case studies is structured to focus on processes that have occurred at the district and, to a lesser extent, the provincial levels. To avoid repetition, more general information on the history of forest administration and forestry sector development in Indonesia, as well as significant national policy and legal-regulatory reforms associated with decentralisation, has been placed in an accompanying report which synthesizes the project's major findings. Readers are encouraged to review the case studies in conjunction with this synthesis in order to appreciate the broader historical and policy contexts within which the district and provincial decentralisation processes are now occurring. District officials have also pressured PT Inhutani I, the state forestry enterprise owned by the central government, and other HPH concession holders to enter into equity partnerships with the district government. This has given the district government a direct stake in protecting the operations of HPH concession holders, and Berau's bupati has publicly discouraged local stakeholders from making claims against the companies-a phenomenon that has been common in much of East Kalimantan. In cases where local communities have made such claims, the district government has generally encouraged the various parties to negotiate a peaceful solution to the dispute without outside mediation. In many cases, this process has led HPH holders to relinquish small portions of their concessions to community groups and to make modest compensatory payments. However, such agreements have frequently provided uncertain benefits for the communities' long-term livelihoods, as they are structured as short-term fixes rather than a fundamental restructuring of the company-community relationship that was established during the New Order period. Since the mid-1980s, Berau has been an important area for log production in East Kalimantan, Indonesias largest timber-producing province. Until the collapse of Suhartos New Order regime in May 1998, formal timber extraction in the district was largely carried out by companies holding HPH (Hak Pengusahaan Hutan) timber concessions issued by the central government. As in many other parts of Indonesia, substantial volumes of logs have also been harvested informally in recent years by HPH concessionaires, land clearing license holders, and small-scale manual logging operations.
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BACKGROUND
Following the onset of Indonesias regional autonomy process in late 1998, Beraus district government assumed considerably greater administrative authority over the forest resources located in the districts boundaries. Berau officials, like their counterparts in other parts of East Kalimantan, used this authority to secure a greater portion of the revenues generated by timber extraction within their districts. They did so initially by issuing large numbers of small-scale logging and forest conversion permits to local entrepreneurs working with village cooperatives and other community groups. When the Ministry of Forestry pressured district governments to refrain from issuing such permits in areas that fell within the officially designated Forest Estate, Berau officials and local entrepreneurs worked together to redirect the allocation of these permits to forested lands for which individuals or communities held title of ownership or some other form of certificate. They have also taken steps to secure a direct equity stake for the district government in the operations of PT Inhutani I, the state forestry enterprise owned by the central government, and other HPH concession holders.
This study examines the early effects of decentralisation on forests and forest industries in Berau. It offers, in particular, a preliminary analysis of how the districts initial response to Indonesias regional autonomy process evolved over time, particularly during the period 19992001.
Methods
This analysis is based on observations made in Berau district since late 1999. We conducted semistructured interviews with government officials, timber companies, and local entrepreneurs for one week in April 2000 and for two weeks in October 2000. Information from forest community groups Map 1. Berau District, East Kalimantan involved in formal and informal logging were obtained through observations and interviews conducted during numerous field visits between 1999 and 2001, which were carried out as part of Krystof Obidzinskis doctoral research. The analysis also draws on numerous published and unpublished secondary sources. It should be noted that much of the data for this study were collected while Indonesias decentralisation and regional autonomy processes were still at an early stage. Wherever possible, we have tried to update the material presented to make it relevant to contemporary dialogues on the effects of decentralisation.
Overview of Kabupaten Berau
The area currently administered by Beraus district government was ruled by the sultans of the Kingdom of Berau from the fourteenth century until the early 1700s, when the Dutch established a commercial presence in Kalimantan (Pemkab Berau 1997) 
Beraus District Economy
Over the last decade, Beraus economy has been expanding rapidly. Table 2 ).
Although for much of its recent history Berau has been a net importer of rice, agriculture and trade have traditionally been the mainstay of the districts economy. Over the last ten years, however, their combined contribution to districts GRDP declined markedly from 75% in 1993 to 36% in 2002. At the same time, the contribution from mining and industry increased dramatically. While in 1993 these sectors combined generated only about 6% of Beraus GRDP, their share rose to nearly 53% in 2002 (BPS Berau 2002).
The decline in the significance of agriculture and trade for the district economy has taken place as a result of the intensification of coal mining by PT Berau Coal, and the opening in 1997 of the PT Kiani Kertas pulp mill. PT Berau Coal began operating in Berau in 1983, continuing a coal mining tradition in the district that dates back to pre-colonial times 2 . The volume of coal deposits currently exploited in the district is estimated to be approximately 427 million tonnes, whereas the overall coal potential in Berau is thought to be in the vicinity of 2 billion tonnes (Bapeda Berau 2001) . In 2001, PT Berau Coal produced 6.25 million tonnes, an increase of 2 million tonnes from the year before. Slightly more than half of this output was exported, whereas the rest was sold domestically (BPS Berau 2001) .
The PT Kiani Kertas pulp mill is located in Mangkajang, a village about 40 km east of Beraus capital Tanjung Redeb, and initiated operations in 1997. This US$1.3 billion investment by the Kalimanis Group was designed to produce 525,000 air-dried tonnes (Adt) of bleached hardwood kraft pulp (BHKP) annually (Barr 2001) . Since it began operating, however, Kiani Kertas has run at less than one-half of its full operating capacity. In 2000 and 2001, for instance, the mill produced 273,875 tonnes and 236,667 tonnes of pulp, respectively, all of which was exported.
Despite the growing importance of mining and industry as key sources of Beraus GRDP, their significance for direct employment in the district has been limited. In 2002, out of an active labour force of 58,727 people in Berau, only 6,522 (or 11%) worked in the districts mining and industry sectors (BPS 2001) . It is likely that a substantial portion of the employment in electricity and water services, construction, transport, finance and public sector and government services (totalling 13,102 jobs22.3%) is indirectly dependent on operations in mining and industry. However, the agricultural sector and trade continued to be the main sources of employment in the district in 2002, providing jobs to 39,103 people or 67% of the districts total labour force (see Table 3 ).
Forest Resources and Timber Production During the New Order Period
Over 2.2 million haapproximately 90% of Beraus total land areais classified as Kawasan Hutan, or Forest Estate (see Table 4 ).
3 Of this, 1.5 million ha has been designated as either Permanent or Limited Production Forest; 353,000 ha has been classified as Protection Forest; and 329,000 has been slated for conversion to other uses. Fifty-three percent of Beraus Production Forest is located in the interior subdistricts of Kelay and Segah, while over one-half of the kabupatens Conversion Forest is located in the coastal subdistrict of Talisayan.
HPH Timber Production
Prior to the implementation of decentralisation, formal timber extraction in Berau was largely carried out by HPH (Hak Pengusahaan Hutan) timber concession holders. The Ministry of Forestry in Jakarta assumed authority over issuing HPH licenses for areas classified as Permanent or Limited Production Forest following the introduction of Indonesias Basic Forestry Law in 1967 and Government Regulation 21 of 1970. HPH licenses, which are valid for a period of 20 years, may be assigned to private logging companies or to stateowned forestry enterprises. In managing the concession site, the HPH contract requires the concession holder to employ the Indonesian Selective Cutting and Planting (Tebang Pilih dan Tanam Indonesia, or TPTI) system, which restricts harvesting to trees with a minimum diameter of 50 cm and which requires replanting on areas where logging has occurred.
The Ministry of Forestry (MoF) allocated the first HPH in Berau in 1969, during the start of East Kalimantans commercial timber boom. Over the ensuing decade, MoF distributed 14 HPH concessions in the district, covering an aggregate area of 1.4 million ha (Kanwil Kaltim 1998). With forests that are rich in high-value dipterocarps, Berau has been one of the provinces most productive sources of timber over the last three decades. During the 15-year period from 1985 1999, HPH holders operating in Berau reportedly harvested 10.5 million m 3 of logs, or over 13% of the 77 million m 3 of roundwood officially extracted by concessionaires in Indonesias largest timberproducing province (Dinas Kehutanan 1999) . It is likely, however, that the actual volumes of timber harvested have been substantially greater than these official figures suggest, as illegal logging by HPH holders and by other partiesis known to have been common practice in Berau, and other parts of East Kalimantan (Kartodihardjo 1998).
By the late 1990s, nine HPH concession holders were active in Berau. As Table 5 shows, these companies controlled concession areas that range in size from 22,500 ha to 530,000 ha, totalling 1.3 million ha. According to official statistics, these firms formally produced 420,000 m 3 of logs during fiscal year /1999 (Dinas Kehutanan 1999 The districts largest timber producer, by far, is the state-owned enterprise, PT Inhutani I. Based in Balikpapan, Inhutani I first became active in 1976, when it was given control of HPH concessions over an area totalling 2.4 million ha in various parts of East Kalimantan (Dinas Kehutanan 1999) . Approximately 365,000 ha of the area initially assigned to Inhutani I is located in Berau. Since the early 1990s, Inhutani I has also assumed control over 165,000 ha of forest area in Berau that was previously managed by private concession holders whose HPH contracts have now ended. In the late 1990s, Inhutani I had operations at four HPH sites in Berau, from which it extracted 125,000 m 3 or 30% of Beraus formal roundwood productionin 1998/1999 (Dinas Kehutanan 1999).
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Among private concession holders, the largest corporate actor in Berau prior to the post-1998 reforms was the Kalimanis Group. Controlled by Suhartos close associate Mohammed Bob Hasan, Kalimanis entered Berau in 1973, when PT Rejo Sari Bumi obtained a 70,000 ha concession. The group expanded its presence in 1978 by securing a 330,000 ha HPH for PT Alas Helau. By the mid-1990s, Bob Hasan had also become the director of the Astra Group, which controlled concession areas totalling 140,000 ha in Berau through two HPHs managed by PT Sumalindo Jaya.
5 As will be discussed below, the Kalimanis Group also secured the rights to develop tree plantations at two sites totalling just under 200,000 ha in Berau. These are being established to support the groups Kiani Kertas pulp mill, which Kalimanis built just southeast of Tanjung Redeb in 1997, although plantation development efforts have consistently fallen well short of plans.
Timber Production by IPK License
Holders Since the mid-1990s, a growing portion of Beraus timber production has been carried out by companies holding Wood Utilization Permits (Izin Pemanfaatan Kayu, or IPK). In contrast to the selective harvesting techniques required under the HPH system, IPK permits allow logging companies to harvest all standing timber from a forested area that is being converted to another form of land use. The Ministry of Forestry holds full authority to issue IPK permits, and it has generally assigned these to companies converting forestland to timber or pulp plantations, agroindustrial estate crops, or mining operations. As Table 6 In 2000, the management of PT Troyanas concession was taken over by the state-owned enterprise PT Inhutani II.
totalled 620,000 m 3 in 1998/1999 (Kanwil Kaltim 1998). This amounted to roughly 50% more than the 420,000 m 3 of logs formally harvested under HPH concession licenses during that year.
Small-Scale Informal Timber
Extraction In addition to the formal timber operations of HPH concessionaires and IPK license holders, substantial volumes of logs are also harvested from Beraus forests by small-scale logging teams operating informally. Surveys carried out in May 2000 indicated there were at least 186 small-scale logging camps within the district (Casson and Obidzinski 2002) . Prior to decentralisation, these groups engaged in timber felling without obtaining any sort of official permit, meaning that their activities were a priori illegal.
Typically, informal logging teams consist of six individuals with one motorized canoe (ketinting) and 12 chainsaws as the most necessary equipment. Daily timber production per informal logging camp is estimated to be roughly 3 m 3 per day (1.5 m 3 per chainsaw, with each camp having two chainsaws). Considering that there are effectively 25 workdays per month, timber production from informal logging groups in Berau can be estimated at approximately 14,000 m 3 per month, or in the vicinity of 168,000 m 3 per annum.
6
The main concentration of these informal logging activities is along the middle and lower sections of the Segah River and its tributaries (Malinau, Siagung, Siduung, Pura, Sambrata, Birang). In the Kelay River area, most small-scale logging activities are concentrated along upper sections of the river, particularly near the settlement of Long Gie and further upstream, in and around the former concession area of PT Alas Helau. Nearer the coast, Lati and Kasai on the Berau River are two important centres of informal timber extraction, while to the southeast, there are numerous small-scale logging groups operating along the road from Talisayan to Teluk Suleiman. The same is the case with overland routes connecting Berau with Bulungan, BerauSamarinda, and Tanjung Redeb-Tepian Buah.
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Although highly unpredictable, income from illegal logging is comparatively high and therefore it is an appealing source of income for local people. Flexibility and ongoing availability are other important features of illegal timber harvesting. Local villagers are involved in this work mainly on seasonal basis, i.e. after planting rice and before harvesting (OctoberDecember) as well as following the harvest and before planting a new crop (March May). The urban poor stay on the job for longer. However, work hardships, the dangers of living in the forest and unpredictable weather conditions ensure that it is rare for anyone to work for longer than 23 months at a time, rendering illegal felling of timber a cyclical rather a long-term employment option. Given such a rate of turnover in labour, it can be estimated that between 4,000 and 6,000 people in Berau may be annually employed in smallscale informal timber extraction. 8
Wood Processing Industries
Beraus timber sector is structured to provide raw materials to three distinct wood processing industries. First, the districts HPH concession holders ship most of their logs to plywood mills located near Samarinda or Surabaya. Second, Beraus own sawmill industry consumes the bulk of the logs harvested by the many informal, smallscale logging teams operating in the district, as well as a portion of the timber harvested by HPH concession holders. Third, the Kiani Kertas pulp mill, when it is operating, also consumes moderate volumes of small-diameter logs harvested from forest areas cleared for conversion to pulpwood plantations or agro-industrial estates.
This section describes Beraus sawmill industry and the Kiani Kertas pulp mill.
Sawnwood Production
The first mechanized sawmills began operating in Berau in the late 1970s. In 1974, Berau still had only a few manually operated sawmills producing low quality material for the local market (Direktorat Perencanaan 1974) . In the late 1970s, when log exports from Berau reached their all-time high, local timber entrepreneurs had little incentive to invest in sawmills because of high demand and strong prices for logs from overseas markets (PT Becosurveys 1981).
In the early 1980s, however, things began to change. As the government phased in a national ban on log exportswhich would take full effect in January 1985sawmills in Berau began to multiply. In 1981, there were already 17 officially registered mechanized sawmills in the district (Pemkab Berau 1981) . Two years later, in 1983, this total increased to 22 sawmills, most of which operated low-yield circular saw blades for production (BKPMD 1988) . In 1995, the number of officially registered sawmills in the district totalled 30 units, and the first high-yield band saw blades were installed. 9 As of May 2000, 40 sawmills were operating in Berau (Obidzinski et al. 2001, Casson and Obidzinski 2002) .
Thirty-three of the operating sawmills are located within a 10 km radius of the district capital of Tanjung Redeb, as well as along the lower course of the Berau River. The remaining seven mills operate in the Talisayan seaboard area stretching from Tabalar to Teluk Suleiman. Of the districts active mills, 13 can be described as large mills (with two or more band saws); 6 as mediumsized mills (one band saw); and 21 as small facilities (circular blades).
The aggregate real production by Beraus sawmills is estimated to be in the vicinity of 90 000 m 3 per year.
10 This estimate is based on the assumption that the districts mills run at 60% of their annual operating capacities, which is believed to total 121,000 m 3 for the 13 large sawmills, 17,000 m 3 for the six medium-sized mills and 15,000 m 3 for the 21 small mills.
11 This figure is several times higher than the volumes officially reported by the Provincial Forestry Service, which put Beraus total sawnwood production at 7,500 m 3 for fiscal year 2000 (BPS Berau 2001) .
A more conservative indication of the extent of the unreported production of sawn timber in Berau can be gained by analysing district export statistics. As Table 7 shows, the volume of sawn timber shipped out of Berau since the mid-1990s has been considerably and consistently higher than the reported production levels. This indicates that over the last several years, actual production levels have been substantially under-reported. Assuming that Beraus sawmills have an average log conversion ratio of 50%, then the production of 90,000 m 3 of sawn timber in 2000 would have required approximately 180,000 m 3 of roundwood. Mills in the district rely on three methods of procuring the necessary raw timber for processing: 1) some establish networks of logging crews which are paid to fell timber and deliver it to the mills; 2) some buy timber from logging crews working independently; and 3) some obtain logs harvested through the clearing of village forests under the guise of establishing community plantations for village cooperatives KUD (Kelompok Unit Desa) or farmers groups KT (Kelompok Tani).
Beraus sawnwood industry is still quite selective with regard to the type, size, and quality of timber processed. Approximately 50% of the logs consumed are red meranti, 20% keruing, 15% kapur, and 15% a variety of other types. In general, large and medium-sized sawmills will not accept red meranti logs that are less than 50 cm in diameter. For keruing, the minimum diameter is 40 cm. The reason for this selectivity is that after cutting and drying, smaller diameter timber tends to bend and have poorer texture, making it more difficult to sell. Small sawmills, by contrast, will often accept smaller diameter logs, which are used to produce lumber destined for local consumption.
Approximately 90% of the sawnwood produced in Berau is shipped to markets outside of the district. Most (approximately 60%) is sent to markets in Java, particularly Surabaya. Roughly 30% is exported to the East Malaysian state of Sabah, and 10% is shipped to Makassar and ParePare in Sulawesi. 
Pulp Production PT Kiani Kertas
In the mid-1990s, Bob Hasans Kalimanis Group developed a large-scale pulp project in Mangkajang, located 40 km south of Tanjung Redeb. The Kiani Kertas pulp mill had an official production capacity of 525,000 tons per annum when it came online in mid-1997, and reportedly cost US$1.3 billion to build (Kenny 1997) . Drawing on its owners close ties with President Suharto, the Kalimanis Group received heavy government subsidies for the construction of the Kiani mill (Barr 2000) . These included at least US$300 million in loans from four state banks; an allocation of US$100 million from the governments Reforestation Fund; and a 10-year holiday on corporate income tax. In addition, the Suharto government gave Kiani Kertas a permanent waiver on the payment of import and export duties for all capital goods.
It is widely reported within the industry that the real costs involved in the construction of the Kiani mill were substantially lower than those reported by the companyperhaps by as much as one-half (Barr 2000) . According to individuals involved with the mills operation, the diversion of finance during the construction of Kiani Kertas resulted in the creation of a highly inefficient processing unit.
13 Many of the components purchased for the mill were apparently rebuilt, rather than new; and the use of sub-par equipment in some parts of the mill has limited other parts from running at full capacity. In the years since production began at Kiani, the mill has experienced frequent shutdowns, which have incurred substantial costs.
Since the fall of the Suharto regime in May 1998, Kiani Kertass operations have been further complicated by the Kalimanis Groups overall financial problems. In September of that year, Kalimanis pledged Kiani Kertas, together with 33 other companies, to the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) as collateral for the repayment of some Rp 12 trillion (or US$1.8 billion at Rp 6,700 per US$) in Bank Indonesia liquidity credits (Barr 2000) . Kiani Kertas is also directly responsible for US$628 million in outstanding debts in IBRAs portfolio. In October 2000, IBRA entered into a debt restructuring agreement with Kiani that allowed the company to continue operating under its pre-crisis management team and to pay its debts over an extended, 10-year period (IBRA 2000; Anonymous 2000) . In August 2002, IBRA sold some US$480 million of Kianis debt to Bank Mandiri and a consortium of investors (Barr and Setiono 2003 Ostensibly to supply fibre to the mill over the long term, PT Tanjung Redeb Hutani and PT Kiani Lestari have been working on establishing a 183,000 ha HTI (Hutan Tanaman Industri) industrial timber plantation in Berau. PT Tanjung Redeb Hutani was assigned the task of establishing the plantation, while PT Kiani Lestari was made responsible for clearing the original forest and for delivering the MTH to the mill until the plantation becomes the main source of raw material. Both companies are subsidiaries of the Kalimanis Group. While PT Kiani Lestari is wholly owned by Kalimanis, PT Tanjung Redeb Hutani is jointly owned by Kalimanis (65%) and the state forestry enterprise, PT Inhutani I (35%).
The HTI operations of PT Tanjung Redeb Hutani in Berau have been financed largely from Indonesias national Reforestation Fund (Dana Reboisasi, or DR), of which the company is reported to have received Rp 83 billion (Ernst & Young 1999) . However, despite the relatively high levels of financial investment and support it has received, planning and management problems have resulted in a poor operational record for the company. Of the 183,000 ha available for the HTI plantation, only 91,000 ha are actually plantable. PT Tanjung Redeb Hutani claims that since 1993 approximately 67,400 ha have been planted, but only 40,000 ha are currently considered to be utilizable (Botha 2002 ). An area of about 7,000 ha of the planted area is subject to land claims by local communities, reducing the effective plantation area further still.
PT Kiani Lestari is a logging contractor clearing the forest in PT Tanjung Redeb Hutanis HTI concession area and charged with harvest operations once Acacia plantations come online. Although both companies need to coordinate their activities closely in order to fulfil their stated objective of creating a sufficient base of raw material for Kiani Kertas pulp mill, their relationship over the last several years has suffered from conflicts over personal issues, plantation data and finances (Botha 2002) . The crisis between PT Tanjung Redeb Hutani and PT Kiani Lestari reached new heights in early 2003 and the cash flow problems at Kiani Kertas all but immobilized both companies. By May 2003, PT Tanjung Redeb Hutani was operating with only a skeleton staff, whereas PT Kiani Lestari had suspended operations indefinitely. While the supplies of locally harvested timber (both MTH and Acacia) to Kiani Kertas mill have never been great, it appears that the prospect of developing a stable raw material base in Berau for the mill is perhaps more distant than ever.
Indonesias decentralisation process gained momentum in May 1999 with the passage of Law 22/1999 on Regional Governance and Law 25/ 1999 on Fiscal Balancing. These laws provided the legal basis for regional autonomy, laying out a broad framework for the decentralisation of administrative and regulatory authority primarily to the district level. Law 22, for instance, defined districts as autonomous regions and gave them the authority to govern and administer the interests of the local people according to its own initiatives based on the peoples aspirations in accordance with the prevailing laws and regulations.
In Berau, as in many other parts of Indonesia, the initial response to these changes was euphoric. District government officials, local entrepreneurs and members of the general populace were particularly enthused to gain greater control over the districts natural resources, including its forests and coal deposits. They were keenly aware of the fact that Berau had been a major source of natural resource revenue for the central government through much of Suhartos New Order period. In their view, the revenues had been used to enrich the Jakarta-based conglomerates and government officials over the last 30 years, with or very little being returned to the district. The expectation was that local stakeholders in Berau would finally be able to retain the benefits from the resources extracted from within the districts boundaries. Those who were expected to benefit most in this context were local son (putra daerah).
District Regulations and
Revenue Generation Under Law 25/1999 on Fiscal Balancing, districts were given both the authority and the responsibility to obtain a larger portion of their revenue base from local sources. Beraus district government, like most of its counterparts in East Kalimantan, moved aggressively to impose a number of additional taxes on timber and non-timber forest products, as well as other types of natural resources being produced, processed and shipped from the district. By the end of 2000, the district collected the following taxes and fees in the timber sector: Collectively, these new fees from the forestry sector have become the single most important source of PAD for Beraus district government. Between May 2001 and March 2002, for instance, these fees generated some Rp 8 billion for the kabupaten. As will be discussed in the following section, Beraus government has also tried to raise revenues in the forestry sector through the creation of a districtowned enterprise (perusahaan daerah), which has been used to secure equity holdings in forestry concessions operating within the district.
In addition to expanding PAD levels from the forestry sector, Beraus district government has also imposed a third party contribution for sea turtle egg license auctions. Until 1999, sea turtle egg license auctions were controlled by the central government in Jakarta. Since then, Berau has gained the right to carry out sea turtle egg annual auctions on its own. In 1999 and 2000, the district government raised Rp 922 million and Rp 1.05 billion, respectively, from sea turtle egg license auctions.
Beraus district government has also sought to regain control over birds nest licensing, which was ceded to the central government in 1997. Table 8 ). At an exchange rate of Rp 8,400 per US$, the Rp 18.6 billion in PAD that Berau generated in 2002 is equivalent to approximately US$2.3 million. Under the highly centralized fiscal system that Indonesia maintained prior to decentralisation, Berau and other district governments derived most of their budgets through dispensations from the national government. These generally took the form of earmarked grants, the largest of which were the SDO (subsidi daerah otonom, or subsidy for autonomous regions), which covered civil servant salaries and recurrent expenditures for regional governments; and INPRES (instruksi presiden) grants that were intended to finance development spending (World Bank 2003) .
Fiscal Balancing and Forestry Revenues
Within the forestry sector, the vast majority of tax revenues collected from HPH timber concession holders during the New Order period were associated with two specific fees: Prior to decentralisation, the central government exerted a high degree of control over both of these fees . In the case of DRby far the most lucrative of the timber-related feesthe national government retained control over the full amount collected. However, in the case of the PSDH, the central government was required to distribute 45% of the total amount collected to the provincial governments for use on development expenditures. Of the PSDH funds allocated to the provinces, one-third (or 15% of total PSDH receipts) were earmarked for development expenditures at the kabupaten level.
With the implementation of Law 25/1999, district and provincial governments are now able to retain a significantly larger portion of the revenues associated with natural resources extracted within their jurisdictions. Under fiscal balancing, both the PSDH forest resource royalty and mining rents are divided as follows:
Central government 20 % Provincial government 16 % Originating district government 32 % Other district governments in same province 32%
Since the onset of decentralisation, this new division of natural resource taxes has had a very direct and significant effect on Beraus district budget (see Table 8 .
The struggle for control over DR revenues was not limited to the negotiations between the province and the national government. While those discussions were occurring, the kabupaten governments in Berau and other timber-rich districts were taking steps to ensure that they would receive an acceptable share of the forest rents derived from timber harvested within their boundaries . As noted by Barr et al. (2001) payments made by HPH holders operating within their boundaries should be retained by the kabupaten government. Echoing arguments made by the provincial government in its negotiations with Jakarta, the bupatis argued that it was unfair for DR fees flowing from their districts to be used by East Kalimantans provincial government to subsidize districts with lower timber production .
In 2002, Berau reportedly secured Rp 22 billion (or approximately US$2.6 million) 17 in DR allocations. Representing approximately 5 % of the districts total revenues, this was a substantial increase over the Rp 5 billion that Berau obtained in 2000.
Emergence of a District Timber Regime
As in many other kabupaten in East Kalimantan, Beraus district government has used the authority granted to it under Indonesias decentralisation laws to establish greater local control over the districts timber sector. 18 PP 6/ 1999, issued in January 1999, gave authority to district governments to allocate HPHH licenses for the extraction of timber and/or non-timber forest products in areas of 100 ha located within the government-controlled Forestry Estate (Kawasan Hutan).
In Berau, as in the neighbouring kabupaten of Bulungan and Malinau, the district government issued only a relatively small number of HPHH licenses before introducing regulations for IPPK forest conversion permits , Suramenggala et al. 2001 . The terms of the perda authorizing the allocation of IPPK permits in each of these kabupaten were almost identical: IPPK permits can be assigned to individual land owners, village and government cooperative, farmers groups, community conservation groups, and companies or other agencies that are legally managing areas of Privately Owned Forest. Permit holders are allowed to clearfell forest in the areas defined in the IPPK contract as long as this does not have a negative effect. Permit holders are not required to pay PSDH or other national and provincial-level royalties associated with the HPH concession system, though they are subject to fees imposed by the kabupaten government.
19 The IPPK permit may range in duration between 3 and 6 months, and if stands of commercial timber remain by the time the license expires, it may be renewed up to three times (c.f. .
Between March 1999 and January 2000, Beraus district government issued 33 IPPK permits covering 11,396 ha with an aggregate log production target of 218,329 m 3 (Table 9 ). Kabupaten officials used these permits for a variety of purposes. As noted above, they were eager to expand Beraus district revenue base, and the issuance of IPPK permits provided an important source of PAD as well as informal revenue flows. Second, the allocation of these permits to village cooperatives and farmers groups allowed the bupati to appease local communities, who had not been allowed to share in the benefits The proliferation of IPKTM permits beginning in late 2000 greatly expanded the local political power of Beraus Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan), as it became a key institutional actor in the allocation of district logging permits. Previously, timber brokers had to secure the approval of the district Branch Office of the Provincial Forestry Service in order to obtain an IPPK permit for a particular area they wanted to log. To obtain an IPKTM permit, however, they had to obtain support from the district Land Agencyspecifically, they needed documentation declaring that the area to be logged was privately owned land that fell outside the Forest Estate. These new procedures led some entrepreneurial timber brokers to work closely with households that had participated in Indonesias transmigration program and other national land programs. In contrast to most indigenous communities who relied on adat, or customary rights, transmigrant households often held some form of legal title to their land which facilitated the process of obtaining an IPKTM permit. In addition, many IPKTM permits have been issued to groups that have been able to negotiate the release of forested areas from HPH concession holders, ostensibly for community use. In such cases, the IPKTM application is often supported not by legal title to privately owned land but, instead, by a letter of release (surat pelepasan) from the HPH holder.
Towards the end of 2002, the district government in Berau stopped issuing new IPKTM permits. In early 2003, it announced that extensions would no longer be considered once the existing licenses expired. To a significant degree, it would appear that Berau district policymakers interest in issuing small-scale logging permits has diminished as they have gained greater control over the activities of HPH concessionaires.
District Control Over HPH
Concession holders District authorities in Berau have used pressure tactics to establish greater district control over HPH concession holders. The have acted strategically by issuing IPPK/IPKTM permits inside existing HPH concession areas, while providing simultaneous public support for HPH concessionaires. For example, the bupati and other district officials have repeatedly made public statements emphasizing the positive contributions of HPH concessionaires to the district economy. At the same time, they have called on these companies to increase their payments to the district government, to work more closely with local communities, and to give the district government a direct shareholding stake in their operations.
With this strategy, the district government has succeeded in acquiring a majority of shares in an 83,250 ha block of the HPH concession held by the state-owned forestry enterprise PT Inhutani I. In 2002, Berau officials formed a new district forestry company (Perusahaan Daerah) named PT Hutan Sanggam Labanan Lestari, to manage this block. Following extended negotiations, the district government (through PT Hutan Sanggam Labanan Lestari) obtained 50% of the shares in the block; Inhutani I retained 30% of the shares; while the provincial government secured the remaining 20%. While this partial takeover of the Inhutani I concession was underway, negotiations for a similar arrangement between the district government and other HPH companies in the district (e.g. PT Inhutani II) were also in process.
Establishing a District Forestry
Service In establishing greater control over logging activities within its jurisdiction, Beraus district government has also taken steps to establish a District Forestry Service (Dinas Kehutanan Kabupaten). Prior to 1998, the forestry office in Berau was one of several branch offices (Cabang Dinas Kehutanan, CDK) of the Samarinda-based Provincial Forestry Service (Dinas Kehutanan Propinsi). The CDK office largely functioned to implement decisions made by forestry officials at the provincial level. During late 1999 and early 2000, however, as the district government began to issue large numbers of IPPK permits, the district government asserted its new authority under Indonesias decentralisation laws and placed the Dinas Kehutanan office in Berau under the supervision of the bupati. With this development, forestry officials based in Tanjung Redeb no longer report to provincial officials in Samarinda; rather, they are now responsible for implementing decisions made by policymakers at the district level.
The Provincial Forestry Service has countered this administrative shift by establishing in Berau and several other districts a new forestry administration agency called the UPTD (Unit Pelaksanaan Teknis Daerah, or Regional Technical Implementation Unit). Officially, the UPTD is charged with overseeing technical forestry issues such as prevention of forest fires and with providing administrative assistance in potentially sensitive cases, such as where HPH concessions are located across more than one district. In practice, however, the UPTD has taken charge of strategic tasks such as monitoring log production and issuing timber export licenses. This has placed some limitations on the ability of Beraus forestry authorities to generate revenues from their forest resources. Not surprisingly, the presence of the UPTD in Berau has become a source of tension between district and provincial forestry authorities.
District Timber Politics
As the district government began to issue IPPK permits, a handful of local entrepreneurs quickly recognized the potential profits of operating smallscale timber concessions and started seeking community groups with which they could align themselves to obtain permits. One particularly enterprising individualMr. Imam Toharysaw not only the economic returns that could be generated from IPPK operations, but also the political leverage that could be developed by establishing such partnerships with large numbers of forest communities. Working with a coterie of well-placed individuals within Beraus district government and with backing from one of East Kalimantans leading informal logging networks, Mr. Tohary formed an organization known locally as FP3ML (Forum Pemerhati Peduli Pembangunan Masyarakat dan Linkungan, or the Forum of Sincere Supporters of Community Development and the Environment) in early 1999.
The Rise of FP3ML
Mr. Tohary is a trader and entrepreneur of Banjarese Melayu ethnic background. He became involved in the timber sector in the 1970s when he worked for PT Kayan River Timber, which held a sizeable HPH concession located in Bulungan. During this time, he worked closely with an individual named Angunawan, who has since emerged as the head of a large informal logging network based in Tanjung Selor, the capital of Bulungan District. In the late 1980s, Imam Tohary returned to Berau, where he was involved in brokering deals between HPH concessionaires and Malaysian timber buyers. His activities also included contracting and buying up illegally harvested logs from villagers and freelance loggers, and coordinating log shipment across the border to Sabah. During this time, he also became one of the districts leading traders in birds nests, gaharu, and a variety of other products. In this capacity, he developed close ties with a network of forest communities.
With the onset of regional autonomy following the collapse of the Suharto regime, Mr. Angunawan anticipated emerging opportunities in the crossborder timber trade based on joint ventures with local communities in northern East Kalimantan. He positioned his network to capitalize on these by establishing a number of small organizationssome in the form of incorporated companies (Perseroan Terbatas, or PT), or less formal business enterprises (Commanditaire Vennootschap, or CV), and others as community-oriented organizations known as foundations (yayasan) or fora (forum)in key timber-producing regions throughout the province. The aim was to have these organizations establish alliances, and eventually work contracts, with villages possessing substantial forest areas suitable for logging.
With Angunawans backing, which included strong support from the provincial office of the national police force, Imam Tohary established FP3ML in Berau at the beginning of 1999. The Forums declared objective was to promote equitable and sustainable development for rural communities through small-scale logging ventures. Mr. Toharys well-established network among forest communities and district functionaries, as well as his natural talent for public oration, meant that he was well-placed to develop the Forum into a dynamic organization that would function as an effective broker for community-based logging ventures.
Through 1999 and early 2000, FP3ML established joint ventures with numerous village cooperatives and farmer groups, which succeeded in obtaining IPPK permits from Beraus district government. In such ventures, the Forum generally covered the costs of securing the permits and coordinated the bureaucratic work involved in submitting the application to the district government. In return, the Forum extracted from the community a fee of up to Rp 30,000 per m 3 for the timber harvested, and held the right to market the logs produced. While it generally presented its role in marketing the timber as a service to the community, it would appear that its control over this part of the operation also gave FP3ML and its officers considerable leverage in determining how profits from the logging operations would be shared between the communities and the Forum. In many cases, the Forum also facilitated the harvesting of timber from the IPPK areas by Malaysian investors who would bring in heavy equipment to carry out the logging.
In addition to seeking economic profits, Mr. Tohary also envisioned FP3ML as an organization that could wield considerable political power within Berau. Indeed, he organized the Forum in a manner that gave the appearance of being a shadow government of sorts, with a corporate structure that mirrored that of the district government bureaucracy (i.e. with separate departments of Economics, Planning, Forestry, Mining, Transmigration, Religion, Tourism, etc). On more than one occasion, he also mobilized the Forums members to stage protests against district government policies that he deemed to be unfavourable to FP3MLs interests or to pressure HPH concession holder to release portions of their sites for logging by local communities.
In the run-up to the June 1999 election, Imam Toharys political aspirations also led him to establish an alliance with political party PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional) in Berau. PAN offered financial and organizational support (particularly with speeding up the process of allocating IPPK permits) in return for FP3MLs help in generating support for PAN in rural areas in the national election. Acting as an intermediary, FP3ML was to obtain IPPK concession licenses for villagers under the banner of PAN. In order to coordinate these efforts, Mr. Tohary frequented PAN party meetings in Surabaya and Jakarta where he met with the partys senior leaders, including chairman Amien Rais.
21 By the time of the election, however, the link to FP3ML proved to be of little benefit to PAN, as many communities had by then grown disenchanted with the Forums repeated efforts to raise the fees they were expected to pay.
The
Emergence of AJRI and ASBBS In July 2000, a village cooperative named KUD Sipatuo broke away from FP3ML following a dispute over the financial arrangement between the two groups. KUD Sipatuo had been established in the village of Sambaliung on the outskirts of Tanjung Redeb in February of that year. Officially, the cooperative claimed to have some 200 farmers as members; however, fewer than 20 individuals were active in the group. Its leader was an individual named Mr. Bakhrie, a journalist based in Tanjung Redeb. Aligning itself with the Forum, KUD Sipatuo obtained an IPPK permit with the assistance of Imam Tohary. In fact, Mr. Bakhrie explained in an interview, the group actually began logging at the IPPK site before the permit had been issued by the district government. It was able to do so, in part, due to the its association with FP3ML, which at that time still had close ties with the district government.
KUD Sipatuo had two logging groups in the Lati River area felling small diameter pulpwood (bahan baku serpih, or BBS) which it planned to sell to the nearby Kiani Kertas pulp mill. During the cooperatives first two months, its members had felled nearly 800 tonnes of pulpwood. From this, FP3ML recouped its initial investment of Rp 13 million 22 , and made a profit of more than Rp 40 million by charging a fee of Rp 30,000 for each cubic metre of timber harvested. The loggers, including Mr. Bakhrie, earned a wage of Rp 900,000, which is considerably higher than incomes from most conventional forms of employment in Berau.
The following month, the cooperative produced a similar volume of wood. However, FP3ML began pressing for an increase in its fee, claiming that the Forum was losing money on the venture. Imam Tohary reportedly called for understanding among the groups members, reminding them that he had helped them to obtain their IPPK permit and asking them to now help him. KUD Sipatuo initially complied and the fee paid to the Forum was raised to nearly Rp 50,000. This eroded the wages earned by the loggers and generated considerable discontent among the cooperatives members.
Only three months into the partnership with FP3ML, Mr. Bakhrie and other members of the cooperative decided to part ways with the Forum and to form their own organization through which they could continue logging independently. Together with two associates who worked as staff at the local bureau of the East Kalimantan daily Kaltim Post, he established the Association of Reform Journalists of Indonesia (Asosiasi Jurnalis Reformasi Indonesia, AJRI). Like Imam Tohary, Mr. Bahkrie and his colleagues used the banner of reformasi to legitimate the groups activities.
Initially, the ideological foundation of AJRI was total reform (reformasi total) in matters related to the development of a people-based economy (ekonomi rakyat), particularly with regard to the control and exploitation of forest resources. They called for reform of the HPH concession system to provide greater benefits from forest resources to local communities; for recognition of adat rights; and for the development of communitybased economic enterprises such as timber ventures and plantation establishment. Like the Forum before it, AJRI presented itself as a champion of disenfranchised communities, particularly those located in rural areas. AJRI sought to distinguish itself from the Forum, however, by not requiring community groups with which it partnered to pay any predetermined fees. Instead, AJRI claimed that it would settle for a voluntary contribution (sumbangan) from those groups. With this model, AJRI sought to attract many of the village cooperatives that had theretofore worked with FP3ML, and to become a significant actor in Beraus timber sector.
While such plans later proved to be untenable, the initial problem that needed to be addressed was how to secure funds to begin operating. Mr. Bakhrie resolved this issue by establishing a close working relationship with officers at PT Kiani Kertas who were in charge of wood procurement for the mill. In mid-2000, Kiani Kertas was exploring the feasibility of sourcing a larger portion of its wood supply locally within Berau.
23 In discussions with AJRI, Kiani officials reportedly agreed that the latter would be authorized to function as sole suppliers of community-harvested MTHalthough this was contingent upon AJRI being able to assemble and oversee adequate numbers of cooperatives throughout Berau to supply the volumes of wood the mill needed. To fulfil this function, Mr. Bakhrie and his colleagues formed a new organization called the Association of Pulpwood Suppliers (Asosiasi Suplier Bahan Baku Serpih, ASBBS). The initial funding for the venture was provided by Kiani.
As ASBBS took steps to become fully operational, Mr. Bakhrie sought to ensure that the association would be able to obtain IPPK permits for the village cooperatives with which it sought to partner, without unnecessary delays. To this end, he approached officials at GOLKAR, the political party previously associated with Suhartos New Order government. Those officials responded very positively to the prospect of working closely with ASBBS, apparently recognizing the political benefits to the party if GOLKAR were closely associated with the allocation of IPPK permits to rural communities. This led to a meeting in July 2000 at which participants included the bupati, Kiani officials, GOLKAR officers, and the leadership of ASBBS. At this meeting, the bupati reportedly sought to obtain a firm commitment from Kiani to increase its contributions to the districts fiscal revenue base, in addition to financial support in the upcoming elections. As a side issue, the logging of small-diameter pulpwood logs was raised. and the bupati agreed that the district government would provide IPPK permits to support the efforts of ASBBS to supply logs to Kiani.
With this mandate in hand, Mr. Bakhrie and his colleagues turned their focus to other logistical challenges facing the ASBBS. First, the association needed a barge (ponton) to transport large quantities of logs to the mill site. Kiani was reluctant to purchase logs that were rafted to the mill, as these were often nailed together and pieces of metal that inadvertently entered the wood pile were damaging to the chipper knives. In mid-2000, ASBBS did not have funds to purchase a barge, so it was left with the option of renting one. Rental of the barge, however, was complicated by the fact that it had to be shipped in from Samarinda or Tarakan. Another daunting problem was the difficulty of coordinating the work of numerous cooperative scattered throughout the district, in some cases in fairly remote areas. It was difficult for the ASBBS leadership to keep the work of logging crews on schedule, and to collect the timber and deliver to the mill in a timely manner. Mr. Bakhrie compounded these problems by reneging on his earlier pledge not to impose a predetermined fee on the timber harvested by the communities. In August 2000, the associations leadership introduced such a fee, and over the ensuing months, this fee was raised, just as those imposed by FP3ML had been raised several months earlier.
The ASBBS initiative came to a gradual standstill towards the end of 2000 when the relationship between PT Kiani Kertas and Beraus bupati turned sour. At that point, AJRI began to make a shift to harvesting logs for export to Malaysia. It aligned itself with one of the leading informal timber trade networks based in Tarakan and entered into negotiations with several prospective investors from Sabah. In spite of this shifting orientation, AJRI is reported to have retained its strong ties with GOLKAR (and through it, indirectly with the bupati and other arms of the district government).
Tenure Conflicts and Uncertain Benefits for Local Communities
As the spirit of reformasi and otonomi daerah took hold in Berau, many forest-dependent communities began to make claims against HPH concession holders, particularly companies which were operating in areas that fell within forest communities traditional domain. In many cases, this process has led local communities to disrupt the operations of timber concessionaires until the latter have released portions of their HPH areas and/or provided compensatory payments of some sort. Such compensation, however, has generally been limited in scope, and many of the tenure conflicts that have occurred in Berau since the late 1990s have been resolved in ways that provide local communities with few long-term benefits. Through these discussions, the communities learned about the positions that local groups in other districts had taken vis-à-vis external timber companies, and they assessed what options were available to make claims on the former concession site. In particular, they agreed that local communities throughout Berau had a traditional right to claim control over all forests that lay within 7 km to the left and right of rivers and waterways.
The position of the Kelay communities was galvanized in early 2000 when some of the new license holders began to arrive at the former Alas Helau concession site to initiate operations at their respective blocks. In March and April of that year, Berau districthitherto relatively unfamiliar with displays of public discontentwas suddenly awakened by groups of villagers demonstrating in Tanjung Redeb against the arrival of the companies. Local government officials also expressed their dismay at the arrogance of the companies for arriving in Berau and trying to establish their logging camps without first notifying the district authorities. Several officials interviewed for this study noted that the companies took an approach that was reminiscent of the New Order period by completing arrangements for their licenses and workplans in Jakarta and Samarinda and simply assuming that the district government and local communities would support their activities. Government officials and community leaders alike expressed concern that the companies showed little concern for local economic interests and made no effort to include local actors in their operations.
Aside from these initial criticisms of the companies involved, the district government publicly adopted a largely detached position vis-à-vis the dispute between the communities and the new license holders in the former Alas Helau concession area. District officials encouraged all parties to engage in negotiations to achieve an amicable resolution to the conflict. According to district officers interviewed for this study, the bupati also quietly sent signals to the companies that he would support them in their negotiations with the communities if they, in turn, supported the district governments efforts to increase district revenues. This position was apparently motivated, in part, by the district governments concern that local communities were being spurred by the euphoria of regional autonomy to make claims that fell well beyond what was allowed under the autonomy laws.
The governments support for the companies crystallized when several villages in the Kelay area (Long Gie and Merasak) imposed a tax on timber floated downstream by the companies operating in the area, particularly PT Karya Lestari. Both villages began charging a fee of Rp 100 million for each barge load of logs taken from their area. The company agreed to the tariff, eager to get its operations going at whatever costs. However, district officials expressed concerns about this seemingly successful effort by local villages in pressing for and obtaining substantial compensation from the company. Calling on the communities to refrain from imposing unlawful charges, they claimed that a dangerous and counterproductive precedent was being set by these communities. Several officials interviewed indicated that they thought it more appropriate for the money to be made available to the government for its needs and purposes rather than to the villages for immediate consumption.
With little active support from the district government and no outside mediation, the communities of the upper Kelay often found themselves at a distinct disadvantage in their negotiations with the companies. Lacking skills and experience in such negotiations, the communities quickly found themselves in the position of accepting short-term fixes that did not lend themselves to any deeper quantitative and/or qualitative restructuring of the communityconcessionaire relationship. In these negotiations, their position was further undermined by local elites who positioned themselves to serve as intermediaries between the companies and the communities.
The village head (kepala desa) of Long Gie settlement, next to the HPH area of PT Karya Lestari, for instance, presented himself as the coordinator for the negotiating process between that community and the company. As the head of the village, he was required by local residents to hold an anti-HPH stance, defending the land claim of 7 km to the left and right of the river that had been agreed upon by the villages of the upper Kelay. For several months during the first half of 2000, he met regularly with company representatives in the Berau Plaza hotel in Tanjung Redeb for discussions and negotiations. In mid-2000, Karya Lestari agreed to make a one-time payment of Rp 250 million to village cooperative in Long Gie. Soon thereafter, the village head unilaterally changed the communitys stance on the border issue from 7 km to 3.5 km from the banks of the river. Some villagers interviewed for this study indicated that the village cooperative never received the full payment from the company, which had reportedly been entrusted to the village head.
The village head from Long Gie reportedly also helped to soften other village heads in the area, aiding the companies to get their operations under way. In Long Boy (PT Aditya) and Long Pelai (PT Wana Bhakti), he was said to have been instrumental in getting local village heads to go along with the modified model of community forest boundaries (hutan adat). In interviews conducted for this study, it appeared that a significant portion of the community remained opposed to the abandonment of the commonly agreed concept of traditional lands. However, there seemed to be a widespread feeling of confusion and a general acquiescence among a population devoid of representative leadership. Under such conditions, all ex-Alas Helau companies managed to get their operations under way by late 2000, other than PT Amindo.
Subsequent to developments in the ex-Alas Helau concession, disputes began surfacing in other parts of Berau. However, they were handled in a very similar fashion. In October 2000, Dayak Punan in the village of Long Laai demanded compensation in excess of Rp 1 billion from PT Sumalindo Lestari Jaya IV. This payment was meant to compensate the community for graves and fruit orchards allegedly flattened by the company. The agreement was reached and the company continued to operate, after the promises of infrastructure works in the village. In a similar fashion, PT Inhutani I handled the claims of the village of Long Lanuk. Land claims were received positively with promises that the community would be given the resource rights it deserved. In the end, over 1,000 ha was handed over to the village as community forest with the following conditions: 1) the western part of the forest would be selectively logged by Inhutani I and 2) the remaining part was for the use of the community, but they were not allowed to seek logging agreements with external contractors. If they indeed decided to log the remaining area of the community forest, Inhutani I should be the sole implementing partner.
For the remaining timber companies, negotiations with rural communities turned out to be more demanding and expensive, but still without significant consequences or long-term prospects. The Inhutani II operation in the area of the former PT Troyana concession along the middle course of the Kelay River settled the dispute with the village of Merasak by releasing a few hundred hectares of forest for community logging. Similarly, in the concession areas of PT Rejosari Bumi and PT Puji Sempurna land release schemes (pelepasan hutan) have been the principal means of solving disputes with local communities. In the case of Rejosari Bumi, the company released approximately 600700 ha to the village of Meluang for community logging done in association with a local organization coordinating community forestry activitiesFP3ML. PT Puji Sempurna has also released forest area to the village of Kasai at the estuary of the Berau River amounting to nearly 800 ha. Both sides expect further releases in the future.
From the foregoing discussion, it would appear that both the district government as well as timber companies are bent on waiting out the storm in order to get back to business as usual at the nearest opportune moment. The smooth operation of the timber industry are an essential component of the district governments revenue base, as well as officials informal profits, to be ignored or disturbed. On the other hand, the political imperatives of decentralized governance (particularly building local power bases and future electorate) mean that heavy-handed practices of intervention are not applicable any more. The balancing act between the two has been a primary preoccupation of the Berau government since the regional autonomy process began.
This study has traced the preliminary effects of decentralisation on forests and forest industries in Berau during the initial phase of Indonesias regional autonomy process. It has shown that following the introduction of Laws 22 and 25 of 1999, the district government moved aggressively to establish greater administrative control over the forest resources within the districts jurisdiction. As in many neighbouring kabupaten, Berau officials issued district regulations that allowed the government to allocate small-scale logging and forest conversion permits to local community groups. Through 19992000, it allocated large numbers of IPPK permits to local entrepreneurs working with village cooperatives and farmer groups.
Some of the districts more ambitious entrepreneurs established foundations and other types of corporate entities to coordinate the creation of logging ventures with large numbers of community groups. The most prominent of these enterprises has been FP3ML, the Forum of Sincere Supporters of Community Development and the Environment. Under the leadership of a charismatic entrepreneur with long-standing ties to one of East Kalimantans leading informal timber trade networks, and with the backing of the provincial of the national police force, FP3ML developed a network of community-based logging operations during 1999 and 2000. The group also sought to establish a strong political presence in Berau by aligning itself with PAN during the runup to the 1999 presidential election.
By late 2000, however, FP3ML had lost much of its support from the district government and was facing growing internal complaints from community groups voicing displeasure at the Forums efforts to extract higher fees on each cubic metre of timber they harvested. Such a dispute led one farmer group to break away from FP3ML to form the Association of Reform Journalists of Indonesia, AJRI. This group initially sought to organize village cooperatives to supply pulpwood logs to PT Kiani Kertas, but later shifted to harvesting large-diameter timber for shipment to Malaysia.
Under pressure from the national government to halt the allocation of district logging permits in areas designated as Forest Estate, Berau officials ceased issuing IPPK permits in late 2000. In their place, they began allocating IPKTM permits in forested areas which fell outside of the Forest Estate. Many of these areas were transmigration sites or lands for which either individuals or communities held some sort of legal title. In many cases, community groups (and the entrepreneurs with which they were working) obtained IPKTM for areas that HPH concession holders reportedly released from their cutting blocks.
As in many other parts of East Kalimantan, euphoria over Indonesias regional autonomy process has catalysed numerous disputes between local communities and HPH concession holders. In such disputes, Beraus district government has generally sought to maintain a detached, uninvolved posture. In the dispute over the former Alas Helau concession area, for instance, the bupati publicly encouraged all parties to negotiate 3 CONCLUSION a peaceful solution. In such negotiations, community groups have often found themselves at a distinct disadvantage. In some cases, they have succeeded in obtaining compensatory payments for the timber taken from areas that fall within their traditional domain; and, at times, they have secured a release of small areas from the concession sites and/or agreement that the concession holders will not log along the edges of rivers or other waterways. These agreements, however, have generally been structured to provide short-term fixes to the conflicts at hand, and not to provide local communities with long-term livelihood benefits.
Berau officials have recognized that timber production by large-scale HPH concession holders was central to both the formal and informal revenue base of the district government during the New Order period, and is likely to remain so under decentralisation. As such, they have taken steps to shield the companies from land claims and requests for compensation or fees by local communities that they deem to be unlawful . At the same time, the district government has sought to secure a direct equity stake in some of the districts larger concession holders. By 2002, for instance, the district government had obtained a 50% equity share in an 83,250 ha concession block previously controlled by PT Inhutani I. At that time, negotiations for a similar arrangement between the district government and other HPH companies in the district (e.g. PT Inhutani II) were also in process.
Overall, these developments suggest that decentralisation has done little to relieve pressures on Beraus forests. On the contrary, it has probably intensified pressures in some areas by legitimising the clearance of forested areas outside the formal Forest Estate through the allocation of districtissued IPKTM permits. In most parts of the kabupaten, it appears that the district government is encouraging HPH timber concession holders, including the Inhutani concessions previously controlled by the central government, to continue with their logging operations, albeit with the district government as an equity partner. The district government has facilitated the provision of limited benefits to local communitiesnotably through the allocation of IPPK and IPKTM permits, and by allowing them to negotiate claims for compensation and fees from HPH concession holders. However, these benefits are uncertain at best, and unlikely to provide significant livelihood opportunities for forest communities that can be sustained for future generations.
1 Agriculture in Berau consists of the following subsectors: food crops, plantation estates, fisheries, husbandry and forestry.
2 The coal deposits in Berau were first exploited in the 1800s by the Sultans of Gunung Tabur and Sambaliung with the use of slave labor (Campo 2000) . Between 1914 and 1956 , the Dutch company Steenkolen Maatschappij Parappatan operated the mines. Following the withdrawal of the company from Indonesia in 1956, the district government and, subsequently, a national firm, N.V. Agusco Djakarta, tried to continue the coal mining operations, but without success (Obidzinski 2003) .
3 It should be noted that these figures do not include forested areas located within Beraus subdistrict of Biduk-Biduk, which were omitted from the data published by CDK Berau. BidukBiduk is Beraus third largest kecamatan, covering just over 3000 km2. 5 At present, PT Sumalindo Lestari Jaya no longer belongs to Astra but is a part of the Hasko Jaya Group.
6 See footnote 10.
7 It is likely that informal extraction and delivery of timber by land will increase in the near future because of new logging roads that are under construction (from Tepian Buah to the former Alas Helau concession) and plans to reopen old ones (the former PT Bina Segah Utama road from Tepian Buah to the upper Segah River area).
8 Generally, logging is undertaken for about eleven months per year. Also, see footnote 10.
9 Personal communication, Trade and Industry Office, Tanjung Redeb, Berau, 1999. 10 Due to time constrains and methodological limitations of the survey, these figures should be viewed with caution.
11 These estimates were based on the following assumptions: all mills are capable of operating 26 days per month for 12 months of the year; large mills have, on average, three band saws, each of which is capable of producing 10 m 3 per day of sawnwood; medium-sized mills have only one band saw, which is capable of producing 10 m 3 per day of sawnwood; and small mills have, on average, one circular blade, which is capable of producing 2.8 m 3 per day of sawnwood. These assumptions are based on interviews conducted with sawmill owners and employees during 1999 and 2000.
